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PLEADING ESTOPPEL.
I.
N O. subject is fraught with more difficulties for the pleader than
that of estoppel. The problems of "when" and "how" to
plead seem never so perplexing as when- they arise in con-
nection with this subject. That these problems are not confined to
any day or age is evidenced by the reports from the time of Lord
CoKI down to the latest advance sheets of the present day reporter
systems, and the lawyers of no generation have been wholly agreed
on- their solution. No system of pleading yet established has been
free from these questions and with each general change in system
they seem to spring up with their usual, if not added, perplexity.
Conceding this to be the situation, one who attacks the subject with
the avowed purpose and intention of clearing up all of the difficllties
in it, at the outset, convicts himself of inexperience and temerity. It
is with no such expectation that the writer has undertaken this ar-
ticle; he does hope, however, to' bring the matter before his readers
in such a way by the collection of, and some comment on, the auth-
orities, especially the later ones, as to present and in a small way
assist in a solution of, some of the problems as they arise today' in
pleading cases involving estoppel either as a part of the plaintiff's
case or as a defense thereto.
As preliminary to taking up the questions of how and when to
plead it seems desirable first to consider the definition and clas-
sification of the various kinds of estoppel.' Lord Cosx defindd it as
follows: "Estoppel cometh of the French word estoupe, from whence
• the English word stopped; and it is called an estoppel or conclusion
because a man's own act or acceptance stoppeth or closeth up his
mouth to allege or plead the truth."' This graphic definition or de-
scription conveys a forcible if somewhat misleading idea of estoppel,
the real nature of which is shown in less striking terms by the fol-
lowing excellent statement: "An estoppel * * * is an admission, or
something which the law treats as equivalent to an admission, of .an
extremely high and conclusive nature-so high and so conclusive,
that the party whom it affects is not permitted to aver against it or
offer evidence to controvert it-though he may show that the person
relying on it is estopped from setting it up, since that is not to deny
its conclusive effect as to himself but to in'capacitate t.he other from
taking advantage of it.' Estoppels were classified by Lord CoKE as
-13 Coke's Institutes, p. 430.
'2Smith's Leading Cases, Ed. ix (note), p. 744.
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estoppel (I) by matter of record, (2) by matter in writing, now gen-
erally known as estoppel by deed, and (3) by matter in pais. 3 This
classification is still quite generally followed.
There seems to have been. different rules at common law as to
pleading these various 'kinds of estoppel. The early English cases
which take up the question of the necessity of pleading estoppel are
usually cases involving estoppel by matter of record or' estoppel by
matter in writing, i. e., estoppel by deed. One of the earliest re-
ported cases on this subject is known as Goddard's case,4 decided in
the twenty-sixth year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, 1586-7. This
was an action by an administrator on a bond made to his intestate,
dated 4 April, 24 Elizabeth. The defendant pleaded that the intes-
tate died before the date of the bond, and so concluded, that the said
writing was not his deed, upon which the plaintiff took issue. The
jury found specially that the defendant delivered the bond, as his
deed, on 30 July, 23 Eilzabeth, in the lifetime of the intestate, bear-
ing date 4 April, 24 Elizabeth, before which date the intestate died;
the court gave judgment for the plaintiff. In his report of this case
Lord CoKE said: "The reason of 'this judgment was, that although
the obligee in pleading cannot allege the delivery before the date as
it was adjudged in 12 Hen. 6, I, which case was affirmed to be good
law, because he is estopped to take an averment against anything
expressed in the deed, yet the jurors, who are sworn to say the
truth, shall not- be estopped, for an estoppel is to conclude one to say
the truth and therefore jurors cannot be estopped, because they are
sworn to say the truth. * * * But if the estoppel or admittance be
within the same record in which the issue is joined, upon which the
jurors shall give their verdict, there they cannot find anything against
that which the parties have affi-m~d and admitted of record, although
the truth be contrary; for the court may give judgment upon a thing
confessed by the parties, and jurors are not to be charged with any
such thing, but only with things in which the parties differ."
In order to thoroughly understand the reasons set forth by CoKE
in his report of this case it must be kept in mind that in the early
days of its existence as an institution the jury found a verdict from
their own knowledge and they were sworn to speak the truth in
answer to a certain question or questions submitted to them.5 It is
probable that in CoKx's time the transition into the modern jury
had not gone so far as to alter the oath and the jurors were even
'Coke's Institutes, p. 430-
2 Coke 4.
1 Pollock & Maitland. History of English Law, p. x1.
Forsyth's History of Trial by jury, pp. i58-267; 3 Blackstone's Comm., p. 374;
2 Reeves' Hist. 9ng. Law, 164; 1 Holdworth's Hist. grig. Law, r56, x57.
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then sworn simply to speak the truth as to a certain issue and not to
find a verdict according to the law 'and evidence as is required today;
indeed, this would seem of necessity to be true if Lord CoxE's state-,
ment of this case is to be taken as correct. The doctrine of God-
dard's. Case was again enunciated in the case of Speake v. Rich-
ards,6 decided in 1618.
A case7 in the court of the Queen's Bench decided early in the
eighteenth century seems to modify the broad doctrine as it is stated
in the foregoing cases. In an action of ejectment the jury found a
special verdict stating that in a former proceeding in scire facias
.against ter-tenants, of which the defendant was one, the 'writ recit-
ing the judgment of a wrong term, as the record produced in evi-
dence showed, and a plea of nul tiel record being filed and issue
joined thereon, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff in the pres-
ent suit, execution taketi on the land in question and the same ex-
tended. The defendants in the suit in ejectment sought to take ad-
vantage of the variance between the judgment recited in thd writ
and that given in evidence. Thejury'submitted to the court the ques-
tion whether this should be allowed. After mature deliberation the'
court decided that the defendant- "Were estopped by the judgment
in scire facias to say that there was nd judgment as recited by the
writ, "because that matter had -been tried against them, and the de-
fendants were concluded to falsify the judgment in the point tried."
In the report of this case it is said: "And the' court took this differ-
ence, that where the plaintiff's title is by estoppel, and the defendant
pleads the general issue, the jury are bound by the estoppel; for
here is a title in the plaintiff that is a good title in law, and a good
title if the matter bad been disclosed and relied on in pleading; but
if the defendant pleads the special matter, and the plaintiff will not
rely on the estoppel when he may but takes issue on the fact, the
jury shall not be bound by the estoppel, for then they are to find the
truth of the fact which is against him. Thus in debt for rent on
an indenture of lease, if the defendant plead nil debet, he cannot give
in evidence that the plaintiff had nothing in the tenements; because
if he had pleaded that specially, the plaintiff might have replied the
indenture and estopped him; but if the defendant plead nil habuit, etc.,
and the plaintiff will not rely on the estoppel, but reply habuit, etc.,
he waives the estoppel and leaves it at large and the jury shall find
the truth notwithstanding his indenture." The doctrine as modified
by this case and stated in modern form is that the party, who relies
on matter of estoppel, if he has no opportunity to plead it, may show
-6Hob. 206.
? Trevivan v. Lawrance et al. (17o5). 1 Salk. 276.
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it in evidence, and it will have the same effect as an estoppel as
though it were pleaded; but when the matter to which the estoppel
applies is jdirectly averred or denied by one party and the opposing
party takes issue on the fact instead of pleading the estoppel, he is
taken to have waived the estoppel and the jury may find the fact.
In the year following the decision of this case the doctrine was still
further modified, or explained by thd case of Kemp v. Goodal,"
which is'authority for the proposition that where estoppel appears
on the record, as where in an action of debt upon a lease the defend-
ant pleads nil habuit in tenementis, the other party relying thereon
way demur- It must be kept in mind that up to this time the cases
discussing estoppel have been cases involving estoppel by record or
deed Qnly.
-Certain cases," decided during the latter half of the eighteenth or
in the early part 6f the nineteenth century, are cited by the editors
-of SmrrH's LEADING CAsEs'0 as tending to show that the doctrine
announced in Goddard's Case was not followed during- the century
following its decision. An examination of these cases tends to con-
vince one that this conclusion is scarcely warranted by anything ap-
pearing in the cases with the possible exception of "the statement by
DEGREY, C. J., ih the Duchess of Kingston's Case that "the judg-
ment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon the point,
is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence, conclusive, between the same par-
ties." In the other cases cited it does not appear that the estoppel
was not pleaded or that the question of failure to plead it was raised.
In the case cited as a possible exception the question of pleading
estoppel was not raised and the court made the statement quoted as
a general statement of the law of judgments. That the editors of
SMITH'S LEADING CAsEs have mistaken the attitude of the English
courts toward the doctrine of Godidard's Case during the two cen-
turies or more following its decision is indicated by Lord EILEN-
BOROUGH'S opinion in the case of Outram v. Morewood,1 ' decided in
1803. In that case facts constituting an estoppel of record were
pleaded in the replication. In his opinion the Lord Chief Justice
said: "The plea would be conclusive that at the time of pleading the
soil and freehold were in the defendant; and if properly pleaded by
way 9f estoppel, it would estop the plaintiff, against whom it was
8 (17o6) i Salk. 277. See also to same effect, Palmer v. Ekins (1828), 2 Raym.
155o; Heath v. Vennendeft (1695), 3 Lev. 146.9
Aslin v. Parkin (17s8). 2 Burr. 66s; Hitchin v. Campbell (1771-a), 2 W. B. 827.
83o; The Duchess of Kingston's Case (1776), ao How. St. Tr. 537; Rex v. Inhabitants
of the Parish of St. Pancras (1794), 9 Peake 219; Strutt v. Bovington (z803), S Esp. 57.
10 zith JEd., Vol. 2. p. 769.
113 9ast. 349.
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found, fr6m again alleging the contrary. But if not broughi for-
ward by plea, as an estoppel, but only offered in evidence, it 1yould
'be material evidence indeed that the right of freefiold was at the time
as- found; but not conclusive between, the parties, as an estoppel
would be."
Whatever the iuthority of Goddard's Case may have been until
the beginning of the nineteenth century, early in that century, in
1819 to be exact, there was decided-the case of Vooght v. Winch,
12
in which the doctrine of the former case was approved. In the
latter case the question of the necessity of pleading a judgment-in
order to use it as an estoppel was squarely raised and it was express-
ly decided that in order to operate as an estoppel a former judg-
ment. must be pleaded. The court applied the doctrine to 'the case
in hand and the opinion contains no discussion of the modification,
offerea by some of the earlier cases, of limiting the doctrinie to those
cases in which in the regular course of pleading the party, seeking
to enforce estoppel, has had an opportunity to plead it. Chief Jus-
tice ABBOTT in his opinion said: "I am of opinion that the verdict
and judgment obtained for the defendant -in the former action was
not conclusive evidence against the plaintiff, upon the plea of not
guilty. It would indeed have been conclusive if jileaded in bar to
the action by way of estoppel. * * * But the defendant has pleaded
ngt guiltyj and has thereby elected to submit his case to a jury. Now
if the former verdict was proper to be received in evidence by the
learned Judge, its effect must be left to the jury. If it were con-
clusive, indeed, the learned Judge ought immediately to have non-
suited the plaintiff, or to have told the, jury that they were bound in
point of law, to- find a verdict for the defendant. It appears to me,
however, that the party, by not pleading the former judgment. in
bar, consents that the whole matter shall go to a jury, and leaves it
open to them to inquire into the same upon evidence then submitted
Ito them."
It is perhaps unnecessary totrace further the English decisions
on the method and rules -as to pleading estoppel by matter of record
or deed. Yet as certain cases remain which throw additional light
on the question of the effect of failure to plead estoppel it may not
be unadvisable to refer briefly to them here. I allude to the cases of -
Doe v. Huddart,3 and Matthew, v. OsborieY.' These were both
cases in trespass 'for mesne profits, and both followed the rule laid
downt in Goddard's Case, and are authority for the proposition that
122 Barn. & Aid. 662, 21 Rev. Rep. 46:
13 (1835) 2 C. M. & R. 36.
14 (853) 22 .. J. R. (C. P.) 241.
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a judgment in ejectment is not conclusive evidence of title in the
action for mesne profits, unless it. be pleaded by way of estoppel;
where the. plaintiff has had an opportunity to 'do so; but the plaintiff
having waived the right to plead the judgment as an estoppel may
introduce it in.evidence, to prove his title though it will not be con-
clusive for this purpose. As is suggested by the editors of SmITH's
LEING CAsS,15 it is possible to reconcile all of the cases that have
been cited if the language used in the opinions is not considered
apart from the facts in connection with which it is used. Those
-cases in which the broad rule is statejl that estoppel must be pleaded
in order to constitute a bar will be found to involve a situation where
the party'seeking to enforce the estoppel had an opportunity to plead
it and chose'to file another plea. There is nothing in the earlier
decisions that conflicts with the doctrine stated in some of the later
ones that where the opportunity is present and the party rolying on
a record or deed as an estoppel fails to plead the same, the record
or deed may be offered in evidence, not for the purpose -of a bar, but
to prove or disprove the fact in question. So it seems proper to say
that the rule as fixed by the concurring English authorities is- that
estoppel by matter of record, or deed, in order to be given in evi-
dence as a bar, must be pleaded by. the party relying thereon, if he
has the opportunity to do so, but if the opportunity is not furnished
in the regular course of pleading, then the evidence of the record
or deed may be taken as conclusive. It is true that the statements of
the judges in the opinions .in one or two of the cases cited if taken
in the broadest meaning that might be attributed to them would be
in conflict with the rule is above 9tated, but if only that. meaning is
given to the words which is necessary to uphold the decisions in
those cases there is no conflict. There is nothing in any of the
English cases referred to in the foregoing pages that indicates an
opinion on the part of the judges that the Qrder or general rules
of pleading in cases involving estoppel should be any different than
in other- cases. In other words, the judges and expounders of the
lawv have riever meant to say that one should violate the logical order
of pleading for the purpose of setting up an estoppel at all events.
Though Lord CoKE, mentioned estoppel by matter in pais as one
of the divisions or kinds of estoppel, the question of the necessity
of pleading it seems not to have arisen in England until compara-
tively modern times. It may be that this is to be' attributed to 'the
adoption of the rules of Hilary Term in 1834. Indeed, this explana-
tioh is suggested by a statement of Chief Justice TINDALL, ifi a case
"'Ed. x, VoL 2, pp. 771-2.
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decided in x842,16 to the effect that the question. of pleading a
certain estoppel by matter in pais could not have arisen before the
new rules, "as both the defense and the answer to it, might have
been matter of evidence only." The most noticeable effect of these
rules was the restriction of the defenses that could. be offered in
evidence under the general issue.17  Estoppel is scarcely ever an
element of the plaintiff's prima facie case, at least not to the plain-
tiff's knowledge; it occasionally arises as a part of defendant's de-
fense, but by far the most common occcurrence is its appearance as
a means, on the part of the plaintiff, of meeting the defendani's de-
fense. Where the defense is such that it can be given in evidence
under the general issue, the estoppel is not to be pleaded because the
plaintiff cannot be certain that the defense which he would urge to be
barred by the matter in estoppel will be made, and of course he can-
not plead an estoppel generally to deny the facts set up in his own
pleading. This is illustrated by a reference to the action of tres-
pass. The Rules of Hilary Term restricted the general issue in that
action so that the plea of not guilty no longer operated as a denial
o.f the plaintiff's possession or right of possession and so if these
allegations of the declaration were intended to- be challenged by the
defendant he was obliged to resort to a common traverse.'
8 Suppose
the plaintiff in such an action took the position that the defendant
by some act of his which had mislead plaintiff was estopped to deny
plaintiff's possession or right, thereto. Before the Rules of Hilary
Term the defense of no possession or right thereto in plaintiff could
have been made under the general issue and so until the trial plain-
tiff could not know whether that defense was to be made and hence
would not have pleaded the estoppel. But after the adoption of the
said rules "in order for deendant to make such a defense he must
have filed a, common traverse denying these facts and the plaintiff
being thus notified of the defense to be made at the trial was in a
position to file a replication in estoppel. In order to understand
,this thoroughly it must be kept in mind that though the general rule
of common law pleading is that an issue well tendered must be ac-
cepted,, and -so when a common traverse is pleaded to the declara-
tion the plaintiff as a general rule can do nothing except join issue,
yet estoppels' form an exception-to this general rule19 and may be
pleaded iii a case where issue would otherwise be joined. This con-
clusion seems not .unreasonable when the nature of a plea of estoppel
11 Sanderson et al. v. Collman et al. (1842), zz L. J. R. (N. S.) C. P. 270.
"1 Martin's Civil Procedure, p. 337.
18 Rules of Hilary Term, V. 2, under Pleadings in Pkrticular Actions. See x Chitty
on Pleadings, 16th Am. Ed.. p. *756.
19 Perry, Common Law Pleading, p. 292.
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is considered. An estoppel is a bar created by some act or statement
of a party, which precludes him in law from making an "allegation
or denial of a contrary tenor."20 It certainly, then, seems logical to
say that if in the case where one seeks to bar evidence in proof
of an affirmative allegation on the part of his opponent, he must
plead the matter constituting the estoppel, it is equally necessary to
plead the matter constituting the estoppel where one seeks to bar
his opponent from denying a certain fact. Indeed, this conclusion
is supported by the comments of the reporter on the case of Arm-
strong v. Norton.2 1 In this case the question whether a judgment
in a former ejectment suit need be pleaded as an estoppel in order
to be put in evidence as a bar was raised. During the argument the
attorney for the defendant referred to the case of Doe v. Huddart
and intimated that in that case the defendant having filed a plea con-
cluding to the country, there was no opportunity given the plaintiff
to reply an estoppel because of the conclusion of the plea. The case
went off on another point but the reporter states: "On the following
day, Baron Pennefather seeing Mr. Griffith (the attorney for the de-
fendant) in Court made the following observations in reference to
the preceding case :-Upon the decision which toolk place yesterday,
as to how far the ejectment was to be considered conclusive in the
action for mesne rates-it was contended on the part of the defend-
ant, that it could hot be held conclusive unless it were pleaded as an
estoppel, and for that proposition the case of Doe v. Huddart was
relied on. In that case there was a plea of the general issue, and a
special plea that the premises in question were not the property of
the plaintiff, and it was siid by Mr. Griffith, that because the latter
plea concluded to the country, the plaintiff was precluded from re-
plying the estoppel, but I cannot concur in that proposition, as I am
of the opinion that he might have .replied the judgment as an estop-
pel notwithstanding such conclusion *of the plea."
The earliest case, taking up the question of pleading estoppel in
pais, which the writer has been able to discover, is that of Sander-
son ct al. V. Collman et al.,2 decided April 23, 1842. This was an
action of assumpsit by the indorsees of a bill of exchange against
the acceptors. The declaration alleged the making and acceptance
of the bill by-the defendant. To this the defendant filed a plea de-
nying the making of the bill, and the plaintiff filed a replication in
estoppel, relying on the fact that the defendants had accepted the bill
20Andrews' Stephen's Pleading, p. 280.
nt (839) 2 Irish Law Reports 96.
2 *z L. J. R. (N. S.) C. P. 270.
See also Phillipsv. Im Thurn (sS6S), 18 C. D. N. S. 400.
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to estop them to deny that it was not made by them. To the repli-
cation the defendants demurred. Chief Justice TINDAI.I, in decid-
ing the case, said: "As 'to the question of pleading the estoppel,
there might, perhaps. be some doubt; but I think that the difficulty
does not arise in this case, if we see, from the matter alleged in the
declaration, that the party would be estopped from putting such a
plea on the-record, and that the plea is bad as it stands; not, indeed,
that I feel any difficulty in saying that I do not see any sufficient
ground for holding that such an estoppel might not be well pleaded.
* * * If the matter here were only 'quasi an estoppel, or mere
evidence before a jury, the plaintiffs, perhaps, might not be allowed
to plead it; but I do not see why the particular objection in this case
might not well be raised by pleading." Justice RRSKINE, in the same
case, said: "The question then is whether such a defense is plead-
able. If the answer to:the action on the bill be such as the defend-
ants set up, the new rules oblige them to plead it, and he has done
so. The plaintiffs then reply the estoppel, and add the material fact
-that the party took the bill on the faith of the acceptance; thereby,
,supplying what might have been said to be wanting on the face of
the declaration. * * * But even suppose- that the question could
have been gone into upon the mere traverse of the acceptance, I
yet do not see why the estoppel may not also be reliedon inpleading."
The report of another case,23 which was heard later in the same
year shows that an estoppel.by matter in pais was pleaded in the
replication, but the opinion contains no discussion of it and the case
is of no particular value except as an indication of what the practice
was.
Some six years later another case 21 was decided, which is of con-
siderable importance in the law of- estoppel. It involved an action in
.trover by an assignee in bankruptcy for the conversion by the de-
fendant of the property of the bankrupt before bankruptcy. The
defendant pleaded the general issue,. that the bankrupt was not
possessed and leave and license from the bankrupt. At the trial evi-
dence of certain acts and statements of the b ankrupt was introduced
for the purpose of estopping the bankrupt and his privies from
saying that the goods belonged to the bankrupt. It was urged by
the plaintiff that such evidence was improperly introduced as
the estoppel had not been pleaded. Concerning this contention Baron
PARKlE said: "With respect to estoppel in pais, in certain cases there
is no doubt they need not be pleaded in order to make them oblig-
atory-for'instance, where a man represents another as his agent
SDarlington v. Pritchard (1842), 32 L. J. R. (N. S.) C. P. 34.
2'Freeman et al. v. Cooke (848). 18 L. 3. R. (N.'S.) Exch.'114.
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in order to procure a person to contract with him as such, and he
does contract, the contract binds in the same manner as if he made
it himself, and Is his contract in point of law ;and no form of plead-
* ing could-leave such a matter at large and enable the jury to treat it
as no contract; and the same rule appears to apply to all similar
estoppels in'pais." The final conclusion which the learned editors
of SMITH's LEADING CASES draw from the cases is that under the old
system of pleading at common law it was "optional either to plead
specifically the facts out of which the estoppel arises, or to allege
or deny, as ,the case might be, that which those facts concluded the
opposite party from denying or alleging, and rely at the trial upon
the matter in pais which created the estoppel, as being conclusive
evidence of such allegation or denial.1 25 This is undoubtedly the
conclusion that is warranted by the language used by the judges in
the foregoing cases. It does, however, seem opposed to the spirit
and all the rules of pleading to say that one, as he chooses, may or
may not plead a certain plea and the result to his case will be' the
same whether he does or not. To those who have regarded" common
law pleading as a scientific and logical system 'a'rule of this sort
comes as a great surprise. If this is the rule; who will now longer
venture to assert that "special pleading is the logic of the law"?
It will be well now to direct our attention to a consideration of the
American cases on this subject. Since there are in this country
two systems of pleading, the common law and" code systems, -and
since the statutes establishing the code system in the various states
contain a clause which, as authorities on pleading and courts gener-
ally agree, serves to chapge the common law. rules as to pleading
estoppel, the cases under these tvo systems should be considered
separately. Following the chronological order the cases under the
common law system should be studied first. It would be natural to
expect to find these following more or less closely the doctrine of
the English cases which we have just considered. As is suggested
by Mr. Smith in his note to the Duchess of Kingston's Case, 2 the
reason for the doctrine of Goddard's Case, if it ever did exist, at
least, is not now present, since jurors are now sworn to findthe facts
according to the evidence, and as the effect of an estoppel, if en-
forced, whether pleaded or not would be to keep evidence away
from the jury, the jurors could not keep their oath and still find
against a good estoppel.' So the reason for the decision haying dis-
appeared we may expect to find that it has had some effect in lead-
ing the courts, where the common law system of pleading is still in
"2 Smith's Leading Cases. Ed. Ir. 831.
$2 Smith's Leading Cases, Ed: 11, 768.
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vogue, to disregard the authority of this celebrated case and that of
the great number of later English.cases which refer to Goddard's
Case as a precedent. It is said, in fa ct, by Mr. Bigelow in his'work
on Estoppel27 that "the tendency of the decisions has been strongly
the other way (i. e., opposed to the necessity of pleading estoppel),
since Mr. Smith's work was published, especially in America." If
the courts take this view and allow the admission of evidence of
estoppels which are not pleaded, the jury under the modern form
of oath cannot disregard the evidence, and, granting that it is suffi-
cient, must find an estoppel to exist even though it is not pleaded. •
In the cases involving technical estoppel the rule of Goddard's
Case as altered by. the later English cases, i. e., that estoppel by
matter of record or deed, in order to be given in evidence as a bar,
must be pleaded by the party relying thereon if he has the oppor-
tunity to do so, but if the opportunity does not present itself in the
regular course of pleading, then the evidence of the record or deed
may be received and taken as conclusive, is quite generally followed.28
Of course, the cases are not uniform, and several courts have taken
the view that technical etoppel need not -be pleaded even though
27 Bigelow, Estoppel, Ed. 5, 698.
28Illinois-Smith v. Whitaker (1849), 1I Ill. 417; Leeper v. Hersman (1871),- 58
I1. 218, (estoppel was pleaded in this case but the question of the necessity of so doing
wa_ not discussed); Campbell v. Goodall (i880). 8 Ill. App. 266, (this case is to tfie
effect that it is not necessary to plead technical estoppel where opportunity to do so is
not given in the regular course of pleading); Mann v. Oberne (1884), 15 Ill. App. 35, 39.
Massachusetts-Howard v. 'Mitchell (1817), 14 Uass. 241 ; Eastman v. Cooper (1834),
x5 Pick. 276 (estoppel was specially pleaded in this case though the court does not dis-
cuss the necessity or advisability of so doing) ; Gilbert v. Thompson (1852), 9 Cush: 348
(this case, while holding that under the system of pleading, established by the statute
of 1836, of trying all questions under the general issue estoppel need not be specially
pleaded, indicates that any matter of estoppel relied on should be set out in the specifi-
cation of defense); Adams v. Barnes (821). 17 Mass. 364.
New Hampshire-Towns v. Nims (1830), s N. H. 259. (This case does not make
exceptions of those instances where the opportunity to plead estoppel is wanting, but as
no reason for this distinction appeared in-the facts of the case, it is certainly no authority
against the exception).
New York-Davis v. Tyler (821), 18 Johns. 490, 492; Wright v. Butler (83oj),
6 Vend. 284; Daws v. McMichael 08.16). 6 Paige i39, 145; Wood v. Jackson (1837),
x8 Wend. 107. 117; Miller v. Manice (1843), 6 Hill 114, 125; Kingsland v. Spaulding
(1848), 3 B3arb. Chanc. 341.
Kentucky-Burdit's Exrs. v. Burdit & Tatum (s8ig), 2 A. K. Marsh 143; Keel v.
Ogden (1835), 3 Dana 103. (Code of Kentucky was not adopted until 1851).
Pennsylvania-Lang v. Lang (1836), 5 Watts 1o2; Kilheffer v. Herr (1828), 17
Sorg. & Rawle 319. (This latter case acknowledges the general rule as stated above but
holds that in the action bf debt, assumpsit, etc., in Pennsylvania, where specitl pleadings
are not required, estoppel of record is conclusive in evidence even though not pleaded).
United States-Insurance Company v. Harris (877, 97 U. S .331.
Vermont-Lord v. Bigelow (1836). 8 Vt. 445. 461;. Brinsmaid v. Mayo (1837), 9
Vt. 31; Isaacs v. Clark (1839), 12 Vt. 692; Gray v. Pingry (1845), 17 Vt. 419, 424.
Virginia-Carrol County v. Collier (1872), 22 Gratt. 302.
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opportunity to do so is present.29  In some instances cases which
at first glance seem opposed to the general rule above stated may be
explained as depending on -statutes providing for the general issue
as the only plea in bar and that all matters of law or of fact in de-
fense of any civil action may be given thereunder,3" though it may
be that the courts, mistaking the true nature of a plea of estoppel-
it is not technically a plea in bar, though for the sake of convenience
generally so classified-have unnecessarily regarded this statute as
affecting it. There are still other cases in which because of the
peculiar nature of the plea of general issue in .certain actions, eject-
ment for example, 3' the estoppel is not required to be pleaded but
is treated as conclusive in evidence. This is generally traceable to
some peculiar statute of the state or states in the reports of which
such decisions are found.32 The reason for insisting strictly on the
necessity of pleading technical estoppel unless the party seeking to
introduce it has no opportunity to plead it has frequently been
stated to be that estoppels are odious and not to be favored by the
law because they shut out the truth. This reason is commented on
and disapproved, as regards estoppels of record, very justly, it seems,
by Judge REDIIlD in his opinion in Gray v. Pingry,33 in which he
said, "I profess myself utterly opposed to the reason, which has been
handed down to us for requiring this strictness of pleading in re-
gard to estoppels of record, that is, that 'estoppels are odious,' 'not to
be favored,' 'because they shut out the truth.' This last clause
seems to contain the pith of the whole matter, the hinge upon which
all odium turns,-'because they shut out the truth!' If it were said
that they shut out litigation, or controversy about truth, I could com-
prehend the force of the maxim, but by what specie of logic is it
2* Maryland-Beall v. Pearre (z8s8), 12 Aid. 55o, 564; Shafer v. Stonebraker (1832),
4 G. & J. 345; Brooke v. Gregg (899), 89 Md. 234, 237.
Tennessee-Warwick v. Underwood (1859), 3 Head 237; Renkert v. 1 lliott (1883), 11
Lea 235. 250; Foulkes v. State (1884). 14 Lea 14. It may be that in these cases the
judges meant to say no more than that where a party to a case has no opportunity to
plead estoppel, it will be conclusive in evidence. The statemert of principle that a for-
mer judgment is conclusive as a bar if pleaded or offered in evidence is absolute and
unqualified, however, and one is led to the conclusion that the courts of Tennessee do
not require estoppel to be pleaded in law cases even where the opportunity presents itself.
This conclusion is strengthened by the case of Turley v. Turley (x886), 8s Tenn. 251, 26o.
0Foye v. Patch (1882), 1,32 Mass. zo5; Gilbert v. Thompson (1852), 9 Cush. 348.
"'Wood v. I-ackson (83). 8 Wend. 9; Black v. Ticker (1866), 52 Pa. St. 436;
Phillips v. Crist (1907), 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 445; but see Finley v. Haubest (858), 30 Pa.
St. z9o, Young v. Black (1813), q Cranch 565, and Kilheffer v. Herr (1828), 17 Serg. &
Rawle 319, where the same rule is held to apply to the general issue in debt and as-
sumpsit.
"Black v. Ticker (C866), 52 Pa. St. 436; Phillips v. Crist (1907), 33 Pa. Super. Ct.
445.
2 27 Vt. 419.
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made to appear that a second contestation of the same matter, after
the lapse of considerable time, and the uncertainty which time always
brings, more or less, upon all past transactions, is to be made more
sure of resulting in the truth, is quite beyond my comprehension. I
hold that the entire doctrine of .the conclusiveness of former adju-
dications, not only as to the merits of the controversy, but as to
all facts distinctly put in issue, nd found by a tribunal of compe-
tent authority, instead of being an odious doctrine, is one of the
most salutary and conservative doctrines of the law."
The rule that estoppel should be pleaded where it can be done in
.the regular order of pleading is not generally applied when the es-
toppel is by matter in pais. As hereinbefore stated the English rule
in cases involving estoppel by matter in pais seems to be- that such
matter may, but need not, be pleaded in order to be produced in
evidence as conclusive on the point for which .it is offered. This rule,
illogical as it is when the science of pleading is considered as- a whole,
has been followed exactly by the law courts of Illinois.
34 The
courts of Michigan have adopted the rule that in law cases it is not
necessary to plead estoppel by matter in, pais.
35 . The practical result
of the i:ules of both of these states would seem to be that in actions
at law equitable estoppel would never be pleaded, As in both of
these states the use of the general issue with notice of special matter
of defense is allowed, the question naturally arises, do statements
that estoppel need not be specially pleaded imply that no special
notice of it need be given in order to prove it under the general
issue? This implication seems to be necessary, especially in Michi-
gan, where special pleading has been abolished since 1846,36 if the
courts of this state take the usual untechnical view and regard the
plea of estoppel as a plea in bar. At least one Michigan case bears
34 German Fire Insurance Co. v. Grunert, (884). 112 Ill. 68, 75; Mann v. Oberne
(x884), iS II. App. 35, 38; Campbell v. Goodall (1894), 54 Ill. App. 24, 27; Evans v.
Hqwell (1904). 211 Ill. 85, 93;'Dickson v. New York Biscuit Co. (1904), 211 Ill. 468;
Gray v. Merchants' 'Insurance Co. (9o6). 125 Ill. App. 370, 375; Roraster v. Peoria
Life Ass'n (9o9), 149 Ill. App. 536, 538. This doctrine in Illinois is probably influenced
by the Practice Act of r874, which allows the defendant to plead "as mank matters of
fact in general pleas as he may'deem necessary foi his defense or may plead the general
issue and give notice, in writing, under the same of the special matter intended to be
relied on for a defense at the trial." This statute, however, should not be taken to
sanction pleading specially defenses which could be introduced under the general issue,
at common law. as the evident intent of the legislature was to allow the defendant to
choose between" the common law system of pleading and the simple-a nd, less technical
system by general issue, giving notice of those matters which under the common law
system would have bad to have been set up by special plea.
11 Rogers, Adm'r v. Robinson (x895), 104 Mich. 329, 336; Dean v. Crall (1894), 98
Mich. "9r; Mowers v. Evers (18!8), X17 Mich. 93; Renackowsky v. Board of Water
Com'rs (igoo), 122 Mich. 613,- 6x5.
. 3'§ so, 07, Mich. C. L. 1897; Chap: 99, § 72, Rev. Stat. Mich., 1846.
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out this conclusion,3 7 and though another and earlier case38 takes a
View directly opposed to this, it may be explained as belonging to
that class of Michigan cases, decided before 1894, which held that
estoppel by matter in pais must be pleaded.3 9 In other states it has
been held that in actions at law equitable estoppel should not b
pleaded, 40 and in one state, at least, it has been held that in order to
bd conclusive in evidence, such an estoppel must be pleaded where
the matter against which it is to operate appears on the record. 41
Although, by the unquestioned weight of authority, in the so-
called "common law" states in this country it is not necessary to
plead equitable estoppel in actions at law, it is necessary to plead it,
as well, as estoppel by matter of record or deed, when the proceed-
ings are in a court of equity.42  The reasons given by the cases for
3Thomas v. Watt (1895), 104 Mich. 2oz, 2o6.
SJ4ohnson v. Stellwagen U887), 67 Mich. is.
"Wessels v. Beeman 0891), 87 Mich. 481; Gooding v. Underwood (i89x), 89
Mich.-187; Pearson v. Harden (1893), 95 Mich. 36o. These cases were expressly over-
,ruled on this point of pleading in the case of Dean v. Crall (1894), 98 Mich. 59.
SConnecticut-Hawley v. Middlebrook (1859), 28 Conn. 527, 536. (The code was
not adopted in Connecticut until 2879, so this case, which was decided under' the old
system of pleading, is cited with the decisions of common law states).
Delaware--Bank v. Wollaston Cr839), 3 Harr. 90, 95.
Maryland-Alexander v. Walter Cr849). 8 Gill. 239, 251 (quoting from. Canal Com-
pany v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 483, on this point, and approving the quotation as a correct
statement.of the law); Bal~ylon v. Duttera (x899), 89 Md. 444; Albert v. Freas (x9o6),
2o3 Md. 584, 591; Shutter Bar Co. v. Zimmerman (igog), zo Md. 323, 320.
Mississippi-Ttirnipseed v. Hudson (1874), 50 Miss. 429, 435. Mississippi is what
is known as a quasi-code state and the procedure act making it such was passed in z85o;
however, the statute making the change is not worded similarly to the statutes of the
true code states in the respect of requiring the pleading of the facts constituting the
cause 9f action or defense. This is the portion of the codes that is regarded as chang-
ing the -common law rule of pleading estoppel, and since it does not appear in that form
in the Mississippi statute, this case is cited. with the cases from states still retaining the
common law system of pleading. It may be well to stat: here that cases from code
states holding that it is not necessary to plead estoppel in pais are good authority for
the proposition that such an estoppel should not be pleaded in a state where the com-
lmon law system of pleading, or an approximation thereto, prevails.
New Hampshire-Chase v. Deming (x86o), 42 N. H. 274, 280.
New York-,Velland Canal Company v. Hathaway (1832), 8 Wind. 480; People v.
Turnpike Co. (1840), 23 Vend. 222, 229.
"Davis, Adm'r v. Thomas et al. (2834). s Leigh (Va.) z. See also Sawyer v.
Hayt et al. (2803), 2 Tyler (Vt.) 288, 292, and Woodhouse et al. v. Williams et al. (1832),
24 N. C. 5o8. (The code was not adopted in North Carolina until x868).
,. Illinois-Potter v. Fitchburg Steam Engine Co. (29o3), 22o II. App. 430, 456..
But see Hoffman v. Burris (904), 210 11. 587, 593, which is authority for the proposi-
tion that former adjudication of the question at bar may be considered by a court of
equity although not expressly averred in the answer, where the fact of such adjudication
fully appears from -the bill itself, even though a demurrer to the bill has been withdrawn
:nd answer filed.
Michigan-Moran v. Palmer (x865), 13 Mich. 367; Dale v. Turner (876), 34 Mich.
405; Connerton v. Millar et al. (2879), 41 Mich.6o8; Dean v. Crall (2894), 98 Mich. 59r.
•Tennessee-Turley v. Turley (1886), 85 Tenn. 251, 26o; Rhead v. Citizens St. Ry.
Co. (2903), zo Tenn. 316,'33o.
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this difference are that in equity pleading the rule is that every fact
essential to plaintiff's title to maintain the bill and obtain the relief
asked must be stated therein and that all matters relied on as a de-
fense must be stated in the answer in order to be availed of for that
purpose and evidence relating to.matters not stated in the pleadings
cannot be made the foundation of a decree.
43 On first consideration,'
one is inclined to think that these same reasons should apply 
to
pleading-in actions at law as well as in actions in courts of chancery.
This would be true if pleading were an exact science and the rules
thereof had always been formulated with the real objects of plead-
ing, i. e., to reach a narrow issue and to inform the opposing party
of itin view. It will be seen, however, that this has not been the
case, and that many defenses have been allowed by the courts to be
introduced under the general issue without any notice or special
plea, so that often times t he plaintiff is not informed of the exact
defense he will be required to meet, and therefore it cannot be said
that in law courts only those things may be proven which havd been
pleaded and that evidence relating to matters not stated in the
pleadings cannot be made the foundation of a judgment. Looking
at it in this light the distinction as to the necessity of pleading es-
toppel in pais drawn by the courts between aciions at law and equity
seems to be justified. The rule that if equity, where the practice of
replying specially to matters in defense has ceased, estoppel should
be set up in the bill by amendment if it is necessary to prove it as a
bar to a defense offered illustrates the strict view some of the equity
courts take of this matter. The usual method of anticipating such 
a
defense is to introduce the defense in the form of a pretense in the





'4 Rhead v. Citizens St. Ry. Co. (1o93), xo Tenn. 316, 330; Connerton 
v. Millar et"
al. (1879). 41 Mich. 6o8, 612; Moran v. Palmer (x865), 
13 Mich. 367; Potter v. Fitch-
burg Steam Engine Co. (19o3), iso Ill. A6p. 430, 456.
See also Story, Equity Pleading, § 257 and § 647; Daniell's 
Chancery Pleading and
Practice (sth Ed.), § 603 and § 33 et sec.
"1 Connerton v. Millar et al. (1879), 41 Mich. 6oS, 6rz.
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HI.
RHE preceding installment of this article dealt withi the English
and the American authorities in the so-called common law
states. It now remains to consider the question of the neces-
sity of pleading estoppel in the states which have adopted the code
system of pleading... Should we expect to find the rule different
under the code system than tinder the common law system? The
usual code provisions respecting the complaint 'and answer are as
follows: "The complaint must. contain: * * * Aplain and concise
statement of the facts, constituting each cause of action, Withbut
unnecessary repetition,' and "'Tfle answer of" the defendant must
contain: * ** A statement of any iew matter cbntituting a de;
fense or counterclaim, in ordinary and-concise language, 'without
repetiti6n." These or similar sections'of the vdrious codes.of pro-
cedure are -the provisions. which are pointed out and relied on as
rendering the rules as to pleading estoppel in the code states differ-
ent from those adhered to in those states in which" the common law
system of pleading, or an approximation thereto, is still'.in vogue.
These' provisions of the code are interpreted .to' mean that the facts
constituting the cause of action or ground of defense, whatever they
may be, must be succinctly and clearly stated in the pleadings.3
Adopting this as the reason for pleading matter constituting an
estoppel in the code states, it seems that no reason or justification
exists for 'drawing a distinction, as to the necessity of pleading, be-
tween the different kinds of est.'-ppel, but that esioppel'by matter of
record or deed should be pleaded as well as estoppel by matter in
pais and vice versa. And, indeed, the courts of the states having the'
" reformed procedure have adopted quite generally this attitude, and
have held that matter of record,4 of deed,5 or in paisO to be availed
2 New York Code Civ. Proc., § 481.
2 New York Code Civ. Proc., § soo.
3Gill v. Rice (0861), 13 Wis. 549; Piercy v. Sabin (x858), io Cal. 22.
'California. Piercy v. Sabin (1858), 1o Cal. 22; Brown v. Camptes (1895), 11o
Cal. 644; Estate of McNeil (9o9), is5 Cal. 333.
Colorado. Hox et al. v. Leis (187o), x Colorado 187.
Kentucky. Morrison v. Price (19o8), 130 Ky. 139, f12 S. W. 1o9o.
North Carolina. Thomason v. Seaboard Air L~ine Ry. Co. (i9o6), 142 N. C. 3oo,
55 S. E. 198.
Oregon. Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Isaacs (s9o8), 52 Or. 54, 96 Pac. 46!; Davis v.
Chamberlin (19o8), 5x Oregon 304, 98 Pac. 154.
Utah. Bonanza Coal Min. Co. v. Golden H-e'ad Min. Co. (19o5), 29 Utah x5g, 8o
Pac. 736.
See also 9 Ency.'of Pleading and Practise 617 and cases there cited, and 23 Cyc.
1523, 253o and 2531 and cases there cited.
' See Big~low on Estoppel, qth Ed., p. 707; Jones v. Peebles (igog), 23o Ala. 269,
30 So. 564.
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*Alabama. Blair v. Williams (i9og), 159 Ala. 655, 49 So. 71; Bank v. Leland
(z8p8), 122 Ala. 289; Jones v. Peebles (z9oi), xo Ala. 269, 30 So. 564. (Alabama is
not a true.code state as it maintains the distinction between legal and equitable actions,
but as its procedure is statutory qnd resembles that of the code states more nearly than
that of the common law states, these cases are cited here).
Colorado. Leachen & Sons Rope Co. v. Craig (29o3), z8 Col. Ct. App. 353, 71
Pac. 885.
Connecticut. Wilmot v. McPadden (9o5), 78 Conn. 176, 6z Ati. rodg.
Federal. In re Stoddard Bros. Lumber Co. (igog), 169 Fed. igo; Pennsylvania Co.
v. Cole. (1904), 132 Fed. 668. (The latter decision was on pleadings under the equity
rules of the Federpl courts and strictly speaking is not authority for the rule in code
states).
Georgia. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Nisbet (2904), ri9 Ga. 316, 46 S. E. 444; Hill
v. Terrell (io5), 123 Ga. 49, 51 S. E. 81; Madison Sulpply & Hardware Co. v. Richard-
son (191o), - Ga. Ct. App. -, 69 S. E. 45.
Indiana. Taylor v. Patton ('903). x6o Ind. 4. 66 N.. E. gi; Adams v. Adams
(1903), 16o Ind. 6z, 66 N. E. r3; Webb v. Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1904),
x6-. Ind. 616. 69 N. E. xoo6; Railway Co. v. Moore (1907), 170 Ind. 328, 82 N. E. 52.
Iowa. Haag v. Andrus (1904), - Iowa -, ioo N. W. 490; Continental Ins. Co. v.
Clark et al. (1904), 126 Iowa 274, xoo N. W. 524; Watkins v. Iowa Cent. R. R. Co.
(1904), z2 Iowa 390, 98 N. W. gxo; McCorkell v. Herron (1905), 1.28 Iowa 324, 103
N. W. 988; Barnes v. Century Say. Blank- (igo), - Iowa -, 128 N. W. 54x.
Kentucky. Peyton v .Old Woolen Mills Co. (Ogo6); 122 Ky. 36r; Hilton v. Calvin
(1904), 25 Ky. Law i8o8, 78 S. V. 89o; Brown Wallace (2909), - Ky. -, xx6 S. W. 763.
Louisiana. Thomas v. Blair (x9o3), iii La. 678, 35 So. 8zz; In re Quaker Realty
Co. (9xo), - La. -, 5s So. 526.
Missouri. Realty Co. v. Musser (1902), 97 Mo. App. 114; Carthage -. Carthage
Light Co. (1902). 97 Mo. App. 2o; George B. Loving Co. v. Cattle .o. (1903), 176
Mo. 330. 75 S. W. 1o95; Golden. v. Tyer (1904), 180 Mo. 196, 79 S. W. 143; Keeney v.
McVoy (1907), 2o6 M o. 42, 103 S. W. 946; Turner v. Edmonston (1908), 210 MO. 411, lo9
S. V. 33; Railway Co. v. Railway Co. (1909). 222 Mo. 462, 121 S. W. 300.
Montana. Eisenhauer v. Quinn (907), 36 Mont. 368, 93 Pac. 38; City of Butte
v. Mikosowitz (igog), 39 Mont. 350, z2 Pac. 593.
Nebraska. Nebraska Mortgage Loan Co. v. Van Kloster (1894), 42 Neb. 746; Union
State Bank v. Hutton (qo), '64 Neb. 571, 95 N4. W. xo61; Cainahan v. Brewster
(1902). 2 Neb. (unofficial) 366, 96 N. V. 5go.
New Jersey. Scrymser v. Seabright Electric L. Co. (908), 74 N. J. Eq. 587, 70
Atl. 977.
New York. Dresler v. Hard (889), 6 N. Y. Supp. 500.
Ohio. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co: v. Howle (19o3), 68 Ohio St. 614.
Oklahoma. Deming Inv. Co. v. Shawnee Fire Ins. Co. (19o5), 16 Oki. z, 83 Pac.
9g8; Town v. Gas Co. (i9o8), 22 Oki. 347, 97 Pac. 1007; Blakemore v. Johnson (19o9),
24 Oki. 544, 103 P2ac. 554; American jobbing Ass'n v. James (29o9), 24 Oki. 46o 203
Pac. 670; Cooper v. Flesner (2909), 24 Oki. 47, 103 Pac. XOX6; Holt v. Holt (9o9),
23 Oki. 639, -102 Pac. .187.
Oregon. Union St. Ry. Co. v. First Nat. Bank (1903), 42 Oregon 606, 72 Pac. 586.
South Dakota. McQueen v. Bank (9o6), 20 S..Dak. 378, 107 N. W. 208; Hickox
v. Eastman (19o8), 21 S. Dak. sgi, 114 N. XV. -7o6.
Texas. 'Word v. Marrs (1904), 36 Tex. Civ. App. 637, 83 S. W. x7; Harle v. Texas
Southern R. R. Co. (1905), 39 Tex. Civ. App. 43, 86 S. W. 1048; Rice & Irrigation Co. v.
Eidman (19o6), 4
z Tex. Civ. App. 542, 93 S. W. 698; Couch v. Railroad Co. (19o8),
49 Tex. Civ. App. x88, 107 S. XV. 872; Oil Co. v. Storage Co. (2909), - Tex. Civ.
App. -, 2z6 S. XV. 397; E1 Paso & S V. R. R. Co. v. Eichel & Weikel (zgio), - Tex.
Civ. App. -, 130 S. XV. 922 .
Washington. Olson v. Springer (292o), - Wash. -- , 1 Pac. 807.
Wisconsin. Wisconsin Farm Land Co. v. Bullard (2903), 119 Wis. 320, 96 N. V.
833; Pratt v. Hawes (19o3), z8 Vis. 6o3, 95 N. W. 965.
See also 16 Cyc. 8o6, and cases there cited and 8 Encyc. of Pleading and Practice 7,
and cases there cited.
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of as a defense by way of estoppel "must be pleaded. Some jurisdic-
tions have gone even further in their statement of the rule, and have
announced the doctrine.that matter of etoppel, whether as an ele-
ment of a cause of action or as a defense, must be pleaded if it is to
be availed of as a bar by the party offering it in evidence at the trial.7
This rule has been qualified in most jtirisdictions by cases holding
that the rule as to the necessity of pleading estoppel applies only
where opportunity to do so is given to the party offering it.8 This
means no more than that the regular order or method of pleading is
not to be varied even though estoppel enters into the case as an 8e-
ment of the cause of action or defense. As a practical application
'of this rule e result is that in those states where the answer is the
last pleading allowed, except in case of counterclaim or demurrer
or unless special leave of court is obtained, as in New York," if the
answer consists of new matter to which the plaintiff would naturally .
reply matter constituting an estoppel, it is not necessary to plead
such matter in order to make useof it as a bar to the defense. This
rule, applied in those cases where the defendant files a specific
California. Fritz v. Mills (x909), - Cal. -- , o6 Pac. 72S; Hubbard v. Lee (1907),
6 Cal. App. 602, 92 Pac. 744.
Georgia. Brice v. Sheffield (1904), z8 Ga. 128, 48 S. B. 925.
Indiana. Taylor v. Patton (1903). x6o Ind. 4. 66 N. 4. gr.
Kentucky. Peyton v. Old Woolen Mills Co. (x9o6), 122 Ky. 361, 91 S. W. 719.
M Qntana.. Capital Lumber Company v; Barth .et al. (19o), 33 Mont. 94, 81 Pac.
994.
Nebraska. Union State Bank v. Hutton'(igoz), 64 Neb. 57i, 9s N. W. zo6i.
North Carolina.' McCollum v. Chistolm (1907), r46 N. C. x8, Sg S. . z6o.
Oklahoma. Deming Inv. Co. v. Shawnee Fire Ins. Co. (9o5), x6 Okl. r, 83 Pac.
918; Tonkawa Milling Co. v. Town of Tonkawa (1905), is Oki. 672, 83 Pac. 914;
American jobbing Ass'n v. James (1909), 24 Old. 46o, 103 Pac. 67o.
Texas. Oil Co. v. Storage Co. (9o9),'- Tex. Civ. App. -, x16 S. W. 397; Rice
& Irrigation Co. v. 3idman (x9o6), 4r Tex. Civ. App. 342, 93 S. W. 698; Rail v. City
Nat. Bank. (x893), 3 Tex. Civ. App. 57, 22 S: AV. 86S.
Utah. .Horiberger v. Alexander (1895), ix Utah 363, 40 Pac. 26o.
Washington. Jacobs v. First Nat. Bank (x896), is Wash. 358.
See 16 Cyc. 8o8 and cases there cited.
'.California. Young v. Blakeman (x9o8), z33 Cal. 477, 95 Pac. 88g.
Georgia. Rowe v. WdLchselbaum Co. (1907), 3 Ga. App. 504, 60 S. X. 273.
.Indiana. Railroad Co. v. Moore (9o7), 170' Ind. 328, 82 N. ]Z. 52:
Louisiana. Insurance-Co. v. Von Schlemmer (9o8), 122 La. 280, 47 So. 6o6.
Missouri. Powell v. Tinsley (1909), 137 Mo. App. 55r, 119 S. W. 47.
Montana. isenhauer v. Quinn (1907), 36 Mont. 368, 93.Pac. 38; Capital Lumber
Co. v. Barth (1905). 33 Mont. 94, 8z Pac. 994.
Oregon. Christian v. 3 ugene (1907), 49 Or. 170, 89 Pac, 49; Tieman v. Sachs
(x9o8), 52 Or. 56o, 98 Pac. 163.
South Dakota. McQueeii v. Bank (1906), 20 S. fDak. 378.
Wisconsin. Gans v. St. Paul F. & M..Ins'. Co. (1877), 43 Wis. 108.
'New York Code of Civ. Proc. § § 478, 487, 493 and 54. 'or examples see Young
v. Blakeman (19o8), 153 Cal. 477, 95 Pac. 888; Keystone Life Ins. Co, v. Von Schlem-
nier (1908), 12z La. 280, 47 So. 606; Gans v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. (z877), 43
Wis. 108.
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denial and the plaintiff's position is that the defendait because of his
conduct, or a judgment, or a recital in a deed signed by the defend-
ant, is estopped to deny the fact which his pleading indicates he in-
tends to deny, renders it unnecessary for the plaintiff td plead the
matter, constituting the estoppel as a sort of a reply for in the re-
formed system of pleading there is no such practice as a further
pleading after a denial.' This, as is stated in the former installment
of this ariticle, 10 is not of necessity the practice in the states adhering
to the common law system. The rule as above stated also applies
in cases where only the general denial is filed as an answer or where
the matter which the defendant contends the plaintiff is estopped to
assert appears in the reply. In this.latter case it is not necessary to
set up the matter constituting the estoppel to meet the reply because
the codes provide for no other pleading except a demurrer to. fol-
low a reply. Where the general denial is filed to the complaint or
petition the rule is the same as the rule in-the common law states
when the general issue is filed, and the reason given for the rule in
such states11 operates here and is supplemented by the reason given
for not requiring facts constituting an estoppel to be pleaded to a
specific denial. It may be questioned, however, whether a case ever
arises in a code state under proper pleadings in which the plaintiff
finds it necessary to take- the position that the defendant is estopped
to deny certain facts alleged in the complaint or petition, for it may
be contended, and, as it seems to the writer, with some degree of
confidence, that usually where such a situation arises the plaintiff's
case rests in estoppel and the facts contituting the esoppel should
be set up in the complaint or petition rather than the facts which are
denied.1 2 The general rule that estoppel must be pleaded'in order to
be taken advantage of by the party offering it has been further
qualified by cases in some jurisdictions holding that where the facts
constituting estoppel are introduced in evidence by the adverse
party himself even though for another purpose, 3 or where the ad-
verse party does not object to the introduction in evidence of the
facts relied on to show estoppel,'14 the court will allow the estoppel
20 See former installment of this article, 9 Mich. Law Rev. 490-1.
21 See 9 Mich. Law Rev. 491-2. For example of general denial taking away oppor-
tunity to plead estoppel zee Powell v. Tinsley (1909), 137 Mo. App. 55r, '29 S. V. 47.
22 See page - of this article.
13 Colorado. Gilette v. Young (1o9), 45 Col. 562, ioz Pac. 766.
'2 Federal. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. Arrott (s9aS), 135 Fed. 75o.
Kansas. Edwards v. Sourbeer (19o6), 73 Kan. 224, 84 Pac. 1033.
Missouri. McDonnell v. De Soto Say. & Bldg. Ass'n (1903), US Mo. 250, 75 S. W.
438.
Montana. Capital Lumber Co. v. Barth (s95), 33 Mont. 94, 81 Pac. 994.
Wisconsin. Lawton v. Racine (z909), 137 Vis. 593, 9 Nx
"
. V. 331. (This case is
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even though it is not pleaded. This rule is not universal, however,
and there are some cases holding that a failure to object to the
introduction of the facts in evidence is not a waiver of th failure
to set up estoppelin the pleadings. 1
The courts of some jurisdictions have adopted a peculiar ( ctrine
with regard to the effect of failure to plead estoppel of recol ,',1 or
"former adjudication" 4s it is now quite generally termed. 'hese
courts state the principle that while former adjudication in der
to be used as a bar must be pleaded, still if it is not pleaded it .ay
be introduced in evidence, and as such, will be conclusive a to the
issues decided in the former suit. One of the most recent of the
cases enunciating this doctrine is Standard Supply & Equipment
Company v. Merritt.7 The plaintiff in this Case brought suit against
the defendant on four promissory n6tes, suing on each in separate
actions of which this case was one. One of the cases came to trial
and a default judgment 'was rendered for plaintiff therein. As the
notes were all given for the same consideration, at the same time,
and under the same circumstances, the plaintiff on the trial of. the
present case and after the production of much other evidence (it does
not appear whether or not against the objection of the defendant),
intrc4uce4 in evidence the record showing the judgment in the for-
mer case. -The court immediately directed a verdict for the plain-
tiff. On appeal the judgment was gustaind and Judge ScoTT of the
Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Term, in his opinion said:
"Nor is it of any moment that the judgment was not pleaded. The
issues between the parties were issues of fact to be determined by
evidence. The judgment was conclusive evidence between the parties
as to the facts necessarily involved, and it was as such evidence that
it was offered and received. It is only when it is desired to use a
judgment as a bar that it is necessary to plead it. It may, without'
being pleaded, be usdd as evidence, and conclusive evidence, of the
facts established thereby." It does not appear from the report of
this case whether the -issue was raised by an answer containing new
matter or by an answer consisting of a denial and in either case the
authority for the rule that estoppel need not be pleaded in express terms, but it is
sufficient if the facts essential to constitute an estoppel are pleaded.- See Bank of Antego
v. Ryan (1899), 105 Wis. 37).
15Alabama. Jones v. Peebles (C9oo), x3o Ala. 269, 30 So. 564.
Iowa. Schofield v. Cooper (z9o5), x26 Iowa 334, 102 N. W. 11o.
South Dakota. McQueen v. Bank (9o6), 20 S. Dak. 378, 107 N. W. 2o8.
16 Garton v. Botts (188o), 73 Mo. 274; Standard Supply & Equipment Co. v. Merritt
(zgo5), 96 N. Y. Supp. X81, 48.]Misc. 498; Kreckler v. Ritter (1875), 62 N. Y. 372;-
Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. United States (1897), 168 U. S. r. But see contra: Meiss
v. Gill (886). 44 Ohio St. 253; and cases cited under note 4 of this article.
IT 96 N. Y. Supp. 181, 48 Misc. 498.
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result reached by the 6ourt was the proper one. If raised by answer
by way .of new matter a reply could not be filed, since there is no
reply inNew York in such a case except with consent of court, and
if raised by a denial, as heretofore explained, 8 a subsequent plead-
ing on the part of the plaintiff would n6t have been proper, so in
any. event' there was no opportunity to plead the estoppel -by judg-
ment. But the language of the court is very misleading and if the
court intended to state the rule to be that evidence of a former
adjudication can be introduced in a subsequent case, betweer the
same parties, involving a like issue, and on that issue will be re-
ceived by the court over the objection, by the opposing party, that
ii has not been pleaded, and treated as conclusive, it is certainly in-
correct in principle and opposed to the weight of authority of the
code states. To say that if not pleaded it cannot be introdced as
a "bar" but may be used as "conclusive evidence" is certainly
drawing a distinction without a difference. The use of matter
constituting an estoppel as a bar simply means that on the point for
which the estoppel is introduced the opposing party cannot dispute
the allegations iade by the party introducing the estoppel; if it
happens that the former judgment decided all the issues raised in
the present case, then -the opposing party cannot dispute any of the
allegations made by the party introducing the estoppel and so such
allegations must be taken as true. How much does treating 'the
judgment as conclusive evidence, in a subsequent suit, of the facts
decided by it differ in result from the use expliiied above? If it
is treated as conclusive evidence on a certain point,' then no matter
how much or how weighty evidence the opposing party may intro-
duce,.it will be given no consideration, and cannot be submitted to the
jury, and the point will not be retried. Is this not in effect the same
as refusing to allow one of the parties to dispute the decision of the
court on a certain point in a former suit between the same parties?
And is this not estoppel by matter of record? It is not meant to say
that a former judgment may not be introduced as persuasive evi-
dence without being pleaded, for this is and always has *been the
rule at common law' and nothing appears in the code to change
it,2 0 but the writer does not believe it should be admitted against the
objection of the opposing party and treated as conclusive,-evidence
unless pleaded as an estoppel. It is possible that all the courts
meant in any of the cases cited was that where facts constitut-
ing an estoppel are allowed to be introduced in evidence without
19See page - of this article.
'- See former installment of this article 9 Mich. Law Rev. 489.
2* Gray v. L~inton (z9o6), 38 Colo. 75, 88 Pac. 749.
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objection, they may. operate as an estoppel even though not
pleaded. If this is the meaning, then these cases are in accord with
others hereinbefore cited on'this proposition.
21 But as the Merritt
case relies for its authority on Kreckler v. Ritter,
22 and in this case
objection was made by the plaintiff to the admission of the evidence
of the record, the above conclusion hardly seems justified.
One of -the most interesting -aild at the same time *most 
difficult
phases of this question of the necessity of pleading estoppel arises
when the matter of estoppel forms a part of the plaintiff's affirma-
tive case. Perhaps' the most usual situation where this occurs is
in cases involving agency by holding out or agency by estoppel as it
is sometimes termed. Suppose for instance the plaintiff has entered
into what he understood to be a contract with the defendant made
through one whom the plaintiff unde'tood -was an agent of the de-
fendant; a breach has occurred, and the plaintiff wishes to sue. the
defendant 'on the contract. Suppose that at the time of entering
into the contract 'the plaintiff did not inquire thoroughly into the
authority -of the person who acted as agent 'but that by defendant's
statements and actions he was led so to believe and for that reason
did not inquire as carefully into the authority as he otherwise would
have done. Suppose still further that the party with whom plain-
tiff dealt was, as a matter of fact, not the authorized agent of 
the
defendant but that the plaintiff does not learn of this fact until after
he has begun suit or even until the trial of the case has begun. This
being the situation the plaintiff naturally sues the defendant on the
contract, pleading that the defendant by his agent undert6ok and
agreed, etc., or as an act done by an agent is in legal effect done by
the principal, plaintiff's pleading may simply state 'that the defend-
ant undertook and agreed, etc. Suppose the defendant denies that
by his agent or otherwise.he ever promised. When the plaintiff
learns the facts of the case, either before or at'the trial, and finds
that the party with whom he made the contract was, not then the-
agent of the defendant, must he amend his complaint or petition 
to
show the facts constituting the estoppel or will he-be allowed to 
pre-
sent these facts in evidence without having pleaded them?. 
The
law is that one who holds another out as his agent; and allows 
a
third paity to contract with him on such basis, is estopped to 
deny
the agency and is liable on the contract made if the third party relied
on the holding out and believed the party with whom he contracted
to be the agent of the first party.
23
2 See note 14 on page - of this article.
26a N. Y. 372.
3 Mechem-Agency, § § 83-4.
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Let us turn to the cases to discover, if possible, what rule, or
rules, have been adopted in practice and the reasons given for the
adoption of the same. One of'the best cases, dealing with the situa-
tion suggested, that have come to the writer's attention is the case of
Fritz v. Mills.24  The plaintiff in that case alleged that the defend-
ant "through her duly authorized agent, executed her agreement in
writing, wherein the said plaintiff agreed- to sell, and the defendant
agreed to buy" a certain tract of land. The defendant, in her an-
swer, denied the execution of the contract. At the trial it appeared
that the party who had pretended to execute the contract as the
agent of the defendant was not, in fact, defendant's agent, though
evidence appeared, which, if availed of, would have estopped the
defendant to deny the agency. The court refused to allow a re-
covery on the theory of estoppel because te plaintiff 'had not
pleaded it. In the opinion in this cash it was said: "That a party,
who has an opportunity to plead an estoppel, upon which his cause
of action or defense depends, must do so, is the recognized rule in
this state." Another case to the same effect is Rail v. City National
Bank.25 In this case the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant
bank upon a contract alleged to have been made by the bank's
authorized agent. The plaintiff appealed from a judgment for the
defendant on the ground, among others, that the court should have
charged the jury that, if the bank held out the person dealt with as
having authority to make the contract on its (the bank's) behalf, it
would be liable for his contract, though, in fact, he was not author-
ized to make it. The court, in commenting upon this objection, said:
"No such state of case was set out in his pleadings. To bind the
principal for an unauthorized act of the agent he must not only hold
him out, but the apparent authority must be relied on in good faith,
and in the exercise of reasonable prudence, by the patty invoking the
conclusive presumption of authority. We understand the rule in
this state to be that an estoppel, which is the principle involved, to
be available must be alleged." There are many other cases, involving
agency by estoppel, or other state of facts where estoppel is the
ground relied on by the plaintiff for- his recovery, which enunciate
the same general rule as the cases cited above. 20
21 (1909), - Cal. -, xo6 Pac. 725.
2 (1893), 3 Tex. Civ. App. 557, 22 S. V. 865.
"Hombetger v. Alexander 089s), ri Utah 363, 4o Pac. 260; jacobs v. FirstNational Bank (896). z.q Wash. 3.q8; Clark v. Johnson et al. (r9o8), z55 Ala. 648, 47
So. 82 (bill in equity); American Jobbing Ass'n v. James (1909), 24 Okl. 46o, r03 Pac.
670 (waiver of performance); Kellog-Mackay-Cameron Co. v. Havre Hotel Co. (i9o9),
x73 FY'd. 249 (the facts constituting the estoppel in this case were set out affirmatively
in'the complaint, but the question of the necessity of so doing was not raised); Mc-
Collum v. Chisholm (1907), 146 N. Car. z8, 59 5. ] . x6o; Taylor v. Patton (1903), 16o
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Some of the courts relying on the general rule that the facts
constituting the estoppel need not be pleaded where there is no
opportunity to do so have reached some very odd results in attempt-
ing to apply this rule in cases: where the estoppel constitutes 
a part
of the plaintiff's affirmative case. A good illustration of 
the result
thus obtained is furnished by the case of Capital Lumber 
Co. v.
Barth.27 In this case the complaint counted on goods sold 
and
delivered to the defendants, and the issue of fact was the 
agency of
the person who bought the goods for the defendants. The evidence
failed to show an actual agency, but did show facts constituting 
an
estoppel against the defendants to deny the agency. 
It did not
appear that the plaintiff knew, until the time of the 
trial, that he
would be forced to rely upon -the estoppel. The evidence was 
in-
troduced Without objection, but later the question of whether 
re-
covery should be allowed on the theory of estoppel, -since it had 
not
been pleaded, was raised. The court, in disposing of this question,
said: "It is the general rule that matter of estoppel, to be 
effective,
must be alleged. Where, however, there has been no opportunity
to allege it, it may be given in evidence with the same conclusive
effect -as if alleged. * * * Since it does not appear that the plain-
tiff knew that he would have to rely upon the estoppel, the 
matter
was properly proved though not alleged. Again the evidence 
hav-.
ing been admitted without objection, the plaintiff was entitled 
to
have it submitted to the jury as if warranted by the pleadings." 
In
submitting to the jury the facts constituting an estoppel because 
no
objection had been made the court is in accord- with several 
cases
hereinbefore cited.
28 But in offering as one of the reasons for this
action the lack' of opportunity to pliad the facts' constituting 
the
estoppel, the court, even though supported 
by some slight authority,
29
was clearly wrong, since there was no real lack of opportunity 
as
that word is used in connection with the rule ast to the necessity 
of
pleading estoppel. Certainly the lack of knowledge of facts 
on-
which his cause of action rests does not, in the ordinary case, excuse
the plaintiff from pleading them, and if without knowledge" of 
cer-
tain facts he has adopted a theory on which alone his pleading 
has
been based, he cannot recover* under such complaint on another
Ind. 4, 66 N. E. 916 (in this case the complaint failed 
to state a cause of action unless
the facts showing the 'estoppel were alleged); Tonkawa 
Milling Co. v. Town of
Tonkawa (1gos). 15 Okl. 672, 83 Pac. 914; Rieschick 
v. Klingelhoefer (1902), 91 Mo.
App. 430; Union State Bank v. Hutton (igoi), 
61 Neb. 571, 95 N. W. zo6x.
(19o5), 33 Mont. 94, 8x Pac. 994.
2 See note x4, page -, of this magazine.
22 Vellum v. Demerle (189a). 65 Hun. 543, 2o N. Y. 
Supp. 516; Hubbard v. Lee
(1907), 6 Cal. App. 6o2, 92 Pac. 744.
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theory, which has first been brought to his attention by evidence
produced at the trial. The plaintiff's remedy, if newly discovered
evidence changes his case, is 'to amend the pleadings so that they
will embody the theory on which he finally seeks to recover. There
is no reason why the rule should be any different where estoppel
constitutes a part of the plaintiff's case. If the complaint is
drawn on the theoiy of agency and at the trial the evidence fails to
establish agency, but some of that offered shows estoppel, there is
no reason why such evidence should be allowed to be introduced
unless the complaint is amended to cover the evidence offered.
When the courts have spoken of the necessity of pleading estoppel
unless the party seeking to introduce it has had no opportunity to
do so, they have used the word "opportunity" as applying and refer-
ring to the order of pleading, not to the information of the party
pleading. The usual case where failure to plead estoppel does not bar
evidence of it because of lack of opportunity to plead it arises where
the code does not allow a reply and an answer by way of new matter
sets up a defense, which, according to.plaintiff's theory, the defend-
ant is estopped to allege. In no instance where estoppel is a part
of the plaintiff's affirmative case would the rule as to opportunity
apply. Still other cases are to be found, which state as a general
rule that estoppel as a part of the plaintiff's case need not be
pleaded.30 •
In order to determine what the rule should be it is necessary first
to consider what facts must be pleaded in setting up A cause of
action in the ordinary code state. As hereinabove stated, the com-
plaint, according to the codes, should contain "a plain and concise
* statement of the facts, constituting" the cause of action. The rule
as to what facts are necessary to be pleaded under this code pro-
vision has been stated in various ways, but, in general, the cases
seem to sanction the doctrine that only legal issuable facts can be
pleaded.3' This, then, is the test in any case, and if the legal issu-
able facts constituting a cause of action are pleaded, all facts, tend-
ing to prove the allegations and not barred by the rules of -evidence,
may'be introduced. So if one determines in any case that the legal
issuable facts.are the facts constituting the estoppel, they should be
pleaded; and, on the other hand, if the allegation, which, though not
true, the defendant is by his acts and statements estopped to deny,
is taken to be a legal issuable fact, then the necessity for setting up
"Plumb v. Curtig 0895), 66 Conn. 154, 173; 'Bernhard v. Rochester German Ins.
Co. (r9o6), 79 Conn. 388, 65 At. 134; Larremoire v. Squires (1898), 62 N. Y. Supp. 885.
31"People v. Ryder (88s), x2 N. Y. 433; Sheridan v. Jackson (1878), 72 4. Y. 170;
Boone, Code Pleading, § lo.
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the estoppel as a part -of -the plaintiff's case disappears. These con-
siderations lead us naturally to the inquiry, what is a legal, issuable
fact? So far as the writer can learn, neither courts nor text-
writers have ever attempted a definition of this phrase, and any
attempt to do so must take one. into the domain of philosophy. Any
definition reached by means of philosophical speculation would un-
doubtedly be unsatisfactory, if an attempt were made to apply it
in an actual case. For practical purposes it seems enough to deter-
mine whether the phrase used includes, as "a legal issuable fact"
any allegation which, though untrue, cannot be disputed' by the op-
posing party, or whether the popular meaning is: to be given to the
word, "fact," i. e., an event or reality. The writer chooses the
latter meaning because he believes that is the one the makers of the
code had in mind, if they considered the question at all. Adopting
this interpretation, it is necessary in every instance where the plain-
tiff's case rests in estoppel to plead the facts constituting it. How-
ever, if the other interpretation, i. e., an allegation which may not be
disputed, is placed on the phrase, it will not, generally, be necessary
for the plaintiff -to set up in his complaint the facts constituting the
estoppel. This seems to be the nearest approach to a solution that
the problem is capable of, as any attempt at a philosophical defini-
tion will introduce more difficulties and more disputes. The start-
ing point in the determination of whether or not to plead estoppel as
a part of the plaintiff's case should be at a certain definition, or
conception of 'the meaning of the phrase, "legal issuable fact." If
one meaning is adopted, it will be logically necessary to conclude
that the facts constituting an estoppel are not the legal issuable facts,
and hence need not be pleaded; and if the other definition of -the
phrase is accepied, a contrary result will be reached. If, however,
two courts enter upon the solution of such a problem with the same
conception of the meaning of the phrase, the ultitnate results should
be identical.
In conclusion, it is the writer's belief that the careful code pleader
will prefer -the rule that the facts constituting an estoppel, whether
it constitutes a part of his cause of action or a defense, must be
pleaded unless there is no opportunity to do so-understanding
"opportunity" to refer to the order of pleading rather than to the
knowledge or information of the party seeking to avail himself of
the benefit of the estoppel. Though, as above suggested, there are
varying decisions on the subject, and some of them holding flatly
that in the case of estoppel by matter in pais the facts constituting
the estoppel need'not be pleaded, still these cases are in the minority
and are opposed to the great weight of authority. Even in Con-
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necticut and.New York, in which states the doctrine that estoppel
may be shown in evidence though not pleaded is strongest, some of
the expressions of the courts leAd one to believe that they themselves
are not too well satisfied with the doctrine or the reasons given to
-uphold it.
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